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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The jurisdiction is proper before this Court under the 
provisions of §78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Appellant's issue for review is whether there was 
reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being committed 
when the officer initiated the traffic stop of Appellant's 
vehicle. 
The standard of review relevant to this decision is that 
this "is a determination of law and is reviewed for correctness. 
No particular deference is accorded the trial court's 
determination". State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
This issue was properly preserved by the trial Court as is 
set forth in Appellant's Response to Sua Sponte Motion for 
Summary Disposition, the parties Affidavit and the Affidavit of 
the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen filed with this Court. 
Appellant relies upon the interpretation of the following as 
being determinative of his appeal: Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution; §77-7-15, U.C.A. 1953, as amended; 
and §41-6-44.20 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. (Attached as Addendum 
1). 
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Further, Appellant asserts that an independent issue exists 
relative to the Trial Court's behavior at the Suppression Hearing 
concerning inattentiveness and prejudice toward Appellant's case. 
The issue is whether Appellant was denied a fair and impartial 
hearing by the Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about January 20, 1996, the State of Utah charged 
Appellant with the crime of Operating or Being in Actual Physical 
Control of a Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol 
pursuant to Section 41-6-44, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. Record pp. 
4-6. 
On or about September 19, 1996, Appellant moved to have the 
evidence suppressed and the charge dismissed by the Trial Court 
on the basis that the stop of Appellant's vehicle was not based 
on reasonable suspicion that Appellant had committed or was about 
to commit a crime as required under Utah law. Record pp. 13-14. 
On or about December 6, 1996, Appellant's Motion to Suppress 
and Dismiss was heard and denied by the Honorable Alfred C. Van 
Wagenen. Record pp. 15, 29-70. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about January 20, 1996, Appellant was travelling 
southbound on Main Street approaching the intersection of 2000 
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North in Sunset, Utah. Officer Bruce Arbogast, of the Sunset 
Police Department was stopped northbound in the left turn lane on 
Main Street at the intersection of 2000 North in Sunset, Utah. 
Formal Information, Record pp. 4-6; Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing, Record p. 4. 
At the time of this incident, Officer Arbogast had only been 
an officer for approximately six months. Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing, Record p. 10. 
Officer Arbogast testified that he made his stop solely 
based on his observation that Appellant was drinking from a dark 
brown bottle. Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 44. 
Officer Arbogast testified that had an occupant of 
Appellant's vehicle, such as a child been drinking from a brown 
bottle, he would not have suspected that it was a beer. 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 58. 
Officer Arbogast testified that he observed Appellant 
drinking a dark colored bottle with a wrapper on it and that made 
him believe that it was an alcoholic beverage. Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing, Record p. 34. 
When Officer Arbogast was asked whether he was able to tell 
what kind of label was on the bottle, he testified that he could 
see some colors, but at the time, he could only probably guess, 
he wasnft exactly sure what it was. Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing, Record p. 40. 
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When asked to describe the side of the bottle, Officer 
Arbogast testified that it was "a standard bottle size for 
alcohol". Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 34-35. 
Officer Arbogast testified that he is not a drinker 
(referring to alcohol), but that he was guessing that a standard 
size bottle for "alcohol" is probably seven to eight inches tall, 
but isn't sure. Officer Arbogast could not answer how many 
ounces would be in a bottle of that size, but guessed it would be 
anywhere from up to twelve ounces. Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing, Record p. 41-42. 
In spite of testimony relating to an unfamiliarity with soda 
and beer bottles, Officer Arbogast testified that most of the 
soda pop bottles, root beer or ice tea bottles are the same size 
as the beer bottle recovered in this case. Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing, Record p. 43-44. 
Officer Arbogast testified that he had investigated 
approximately 10 cases at the time of the suppression hearing 
involving recovery of brown bottles, which were beer bottles. 
This 10 case experience came after he had been an officer for 
approximately 18 months. He had only been an officer for 
approximately 6 months at the time of this stop and had 
significantly less experience. Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing, Record pp. 7, 67. 
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Officer Arbogast estimated Appellant was travelling 
approximately 7 miles per hour at the time of the observation. 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 40, 
Officer Arbogast testified his observation was made through 
Appellant's driver's side window as Appellant was passing him on 
the roadway. Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record pp. 50# 
53. 
Officer Arbogast testified Appellant's truck had a camper on 
it and side mirrors mounted on the doors. Officer Arbogast's 
observation was made after had passed the patrol vehicle far 
enough so that the side mirrors were not blocking the officer's 
view into the driver's side window. Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing, Record pp. 50-51. 
Officer Arbogast testified that Appellant's driver's side 
window was approximately two to two and a half feet wide. 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 51. 
Officer Arbogast testified that it would take a vehicle 
travelling seven to ten miles per hour probably under a second or 
two to travel five feet. Officer Arbogast testified his 
observation of Appellant through the driver's side window lasted 
more than one second. Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record 
p. 52. 
Officer Arbogast testified that he had suspicions that 
Appellant was drinking a Budweiser beer, but couldn't tell that 
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that was exactly what it was. Officer Arbogast believed that he 
saw Appellant drinking an "alcoholic beverage". Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing, Record p. 54. 
Officer Arbogast testified that the thought of whether the 
bottle could have possibly been a root beer bottle did not enter 
his mind at the point from when he initiated the stop. He 
testified that he had it in his mind that it was an "alcoholic 
beverage". Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record pp. 54-55. 
Officer Arbogast testified that he did not include an 
indication in his report identifying the bottle as brown. 
Officer Arbogast testified that he did not include an indication 
in his report that the bottle had a red and white label. Officer 
Arbogast testified to these details approximately 11 months after 
the arrest. Formal Information, Record p 4-6; Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing, Record pp. 1,44,53. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. 
WHETHER THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE 
THAT A CRIME WAS BEING COMMITTED WHEN THE OFFICER 
INITIATED THE TRAFFIC STOP OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE. 
Appellant contends that Officer Arbogast did not have 
reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in illegal 
conduct. Officer Arbogastfs conduct violated Appellant's right 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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II. 
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR AND 
IMPARTIAL HEARING BY THE COURT. 
Appellant contends that the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen 
was inattentive at trial, did not allow Appellant's counsel 
equitable opportunity to present his case as is shown in the 
record. 
ARGUMENT 
I, 
WHETHER THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE 
THAT A CRIME WAS BEING COMMITTED WHEN THE OFFICER 
INITIATED THE TRAFFIC STOP OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE. 
It is clear from the testimony at the Suppression Hearing, 
that the sole basis for Officer Arbogast*s stop is that he 
observed Appellant take a drink from a brown colored bottle when 
he glimpsed at Appellant as Appellant was passing the officer's 
patrol car at an estimated speed of seven miles per hour, which 
would equate to a rate of ten feet per second- Upon making that 
instant observation, Officer Arbogast merely suspicioned that the 
unidentified brown bottle was a beer bottle and proceeded to 
initiate a stop presumably based upon a violation of the Open 
Container law. 
"Stopping of a vehicle and consequent detention of 
its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment, even if the purpose of the 
stop is limited and the resulting detention brief." 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
"An officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop."" State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213 (Utah Ap. 1991) citing State v. 
Deitman, 739 p.2D 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) 
(quoting U.S. v. Marritt, 735 F.2d 223, 230 (4th Cir. 
1984)). 
In determining the existence of reasonable suspicion, a 
court must look at the totality of the circumstances. State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991) 
In the case at hand, it is clear that Officer Arbogast did 
not have articulable suspicion that Appellant had committed or 
was about to commit a crime based upon the officer's suspicion 
that Defendant was consuming alcohol merely because he was 
drinking from a brown colored bottle. 
In the State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), the 
court indicated: 
"...the courts are not relieved of their duty to... 
decide whether the particular observation bears any 
reasonable correlation to a suspicion that the person 
presently is engaged in criminal activity." Sery citing 
U.S. v, Sokolow. 831 F.2d 1413f 1418 (9th Cir. 1987) 
In the U.S. v. Nicholas, 104 F.3d 368, 1996 WL 731605 (10th 
Cir. (Utah)), (unpublished disposition attached as Addendum 1), 
the officer initiated his stop because he thought the driver of 
the vehicle may have been drinking. He based his suspicion on 
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his observation that someone got out of the car with what the 
officer thought to be an open container. 
"An officer's unparticularized suspicion or hunch 
cannot create circumstances giving rise to reasonable 
suspicion." Nicholas citing U.S. v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 
874# 878 (10th Cir. 1994) 
"[s]ome facts must be outrightly dismissed as so innocent or 
susceptible to varying interpretations as to be innocuous." 
Nicholas citing U.S. v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1996). 
In Nicholas it was determined by the Court that the officer 
stopped Defendant because he believed he might have been 
drinking, which must have meant he stopped Defendant because he 
suspected he was driving under the influence of alcohol. As in 
the instant case, the officer in Nicholas described no driving 
pattern to support an inference that Defendant was driving under 
the influence of alcohol. The court found that the evidence in 
that case simply did not support a determination that at the time 
of the initial stop, the officer had reasonable particularized 
suspicion Defendant had committed or was committing a crime. 
In the instant case, the officer had no opportunity to 
evaluate Appellant's demeanor, his driving pattern or any other 
circumstance upon which to base his stop prior to initiating the 
same. Appellant was stopped solely on the basis that the officer 
observed him drinking from a "brown bottle". His observation was 
merely as to the color of the bottle, not even to the type or 
size of bottle. The officer's testimony is clear that he had no 
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certainty that the bottle was in fact a bottle containing 
alcohol, but suspicioned that it was an "alcoholic beverage" and 
proceeded to initiate the stop. The officer also testified that 
he does not drink alcohol, he does not drink soda, teas or other 
such beverages and is not familiar with their bottles. He 
further indicated that he believed the bottle he observed 
Appellant drinking from was a "standard" size bottle for alcohol, 
yet the officer is not a consumer of alcoholic or other types of 
bottled beverages. The "standard" size bottle Officer Arbogast 
refers to is also a standard size bottle for root beer, which is 
also available in brown bottles. "Alcohol" is available in a 
vast variety of bottles of different shapes, sizes and colors 
with a variety of different labels, whether it is purchased from 
a State Liquor Store or from a local grocery store. Soda pop, 
iced tea and bottled waters are also available in a vast variety 
of bottles of different shapes, sizes and colors with a variety 
of different labels. Many of these products, alcoholic and non-
alcoholic, resemble each other. Many of the products, alcoholic 
and non-alcoholic, are available in brown or dark colored bottles 
or are a brown liquid with the appearance of being a dark colored 
or brown bottle. Non-alcoholic beer is available to the general 
public and is in brown or dark colored bottles. 
Had Officer Arbogast observed a bottle unique to types of 
alcohol, such as a "fifth" of alcohol or a quart beer bottle, he 
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may have had a basis for reasonable suspicion. However, his 
observance of a "brown bottle" could have been one of many non-
alcoholic beverages. 
As previously indicated. Officer Arbogast had no other basis 
for his stop such as his observation of Appellant's demeanor or 
driving pattern to allow the totality of the circumstances to be 
analyzed. The totality of the circumstances in this case is 
simply that Officer Arbogast believed his observation of a "brown 
colored bottle" was reasonable suspicion for which to stop 
Appellant. 
The general public consumes these beverages while driving 
their vehicles. There must be some other attendant facts 
indicating that the Open Container law is being broken such as 
behavior, driving pattern, or at least a specific identification 
of the beverage. If we accept that Officer Arbogast1s hunch was 
justified as reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant, we diminish 
the standard the law has upheld and expose virtually every 
citizen of being invaded and having their constitutional right 
violated for drinking a beverage in their vehicle, which may 
possibly resemble an alcoholic beverage. This diminished 
standard could also be applied to beverage cans and allow an 
officer the right to seize a citizen for consuming a Diet Coke 
merely because the can has red, silver and white markings such as 
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a Budweiser beer can had the officer suspicioned that it was a 
Budweiser can. 
Furthermore, it would diminish the standard of reasonable 
suspicion for any stop and would theoretically allow citizens to 
be seized for smoking a pipe, a hand-rolled cigarette, or even a 
cigarette that the officer thought was hand-rolled, with the 
justification that the officer suspicioned the pipe or rolled 
cigarette contained an illegal chemical substance such as 
marijuana. This analogy can then be applied to many innocent 
acts and allow every citizen to be seized because the innocent 
act they are engaging in could conceivably be deemed to be 
illegal. This would virtually terminate every citizens 
protection against illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment of 
the Constitution. 
II. 
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR AND 
IMPARTIAL HEARING BY THE COURT. 
At the Suppression Hearing regarding this matter, the 
Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen, after further redirect 
examination, specifically refused Appellant's counsel opportunity 
to address the State's examination. When Appellant's counsel 
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requested the opportunity to address said examination, Judge Van 
Wagenen addressed Appellant's counsel as follows: 
THE COURT: No, you don't get one more. 
You've had enough. You've had enough. 
Haven't you really? 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record p. 58. 
In addition, after lengthy, detailed direct examination and 
cross examination of Officer Arbogast at the Suppression Hearing, 
the Court asked the following: 
THE COURT: Can you describe the wrapper a 
little fait that was on the bottle? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: It is like a brown paper bag? It's not. 
THE WITNESS: No... 
Transcript of Supression Hearing, Record P. 48. 
These remarks by the Trial Court and other indications of 
inattentiveness are reflective of the fact that Appellant did not 
receive a fair and impartial hearing. It was clear that the 
Court was not interested in hearing further testimony in 
Appellant's defense and had reached the decision against 
Appellant before Appellant had the opportunity to properly 
present his defense. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's decision and 
remand this case to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of June, 1997. 
KELLY G. CARDON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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41-la-114. The notice shall: 
(a) state the date, time, and place of impoundment, the name of the 
person operating the vehicle at the time of seizure, if applicable, the 
reason for seizure and impoundment, and the name of the garage or place 
where the vehicle is stored; 
(b) state that the registered owner is responsible for payment of tow-
ing, impound, and storage fees charged against the vehicle; and 
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burden to show reasonable and probable cause 
for believing items offered for sale had been 
unlawfully taken by the detained or arrested 
person; this section in essence codifies the pre-
existing common law defense of probable cause 
to effect an arrest and expands it to incorporate 
specific private persons in the shoplifting con-
text. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 
R2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
Evidence of prior conviction. 
Where customer sued merchant for malicious 
prosecution, false arrest and false imprison-
ment arising from alleged shoplifting incident 
and introduced evidence the incident left her 
severely depressed and suicidal, merchant 
which wished to introduce evidence of a prior 
shoplifting conviction and its surrounding facts 
as affecting the issue of damages was properly 
restricted to showing fact of the prior act and 
the identity of the party involved in view of, 
inter alia, the similarity of the incidents and 
substantial likelihood of confusing the jury. 
Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 
314 (Utah 1979). 
Liability. 
—Acquittal. 
Store that had probable cause to detain sus-
pected shoplifter's sister was not liable for false 
arrest even though sister was subsequently 
acquitted of shoplifting charge. Davis v. Zions 
Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 29 Utah 2d 336, 509 
R2d 362 (1973). 
Motive for arrest. 
Section offered no civil immunity to a mer-
chant who initiated a customer's arrest for 
purpose of effecting a civil remedy to collect 
money owed, even if the money was lawfully 
owed; thus section did not shield auto dealer 
from liability for false imprisonment where 
customer drove away in new truck after leaving 
check for less than purchase price dealer was 
demanding and dealer called police and asked 
that truck be picked up, saying there had been 
a theft. Greenwell v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury, 
Inc., 575 R2d 688 (Utah 1978). 
Probable cause. 
—Specific cases. 
There was sufficient evidence upon which to 
base a jury verdict denying damages for false 
arrest, where plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old 
motorcycle rider, had placed a small article of 
merchandise in his helmet, justifying a reason-
able suspicion that he was shoplifting. Fuller v. 
Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 (Utah 
1975). 
—Standard. 
The standard applicable to detentions and 
arrests by merchants is composed of both sub-
jective and objective elements; the merchant 
must allege and prove not only that he believed 
in good faith that his conduct was lawful, but 
also that his belief was reasonable; even if the 
crime was not in fact being committed or at-
tempted, if the merchant in good faith believes 
that such facts are present as to lead him to an 
honest conclusion that a crime is being commit-
ted by the person to be arrested then he may 
not be held liable for false arrest. In determin-
ing the reasonableness of the conclusion, the 
test to be applied is one that is practical under 
the circumstances, i.e., whether a reasonable 
and prudent man in his position would be 
justified in believing facts which would warrant 
making the arrest. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mer-
cantile Inst., 605 P2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Impris-
onment §§ 44 et seq., 66. 
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment 
§§ 14, 21 to 25, 40(4) to (7). 
AX.R. — Defamation: actionability of accu-
sation or imputation of shoplifting, 29 A.L.R.3d 
961. 
Admissibility of defendant's rules or instruc-
tions for dealing with shoplifters in action for 
false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, 
31 A.L.R.3d 705. 
Construction and effect in false imprison-
ment action of statute providing for detention 
of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R.3d 998. 
Changing the price tags by patron in self-
service store as criminal offense, 60 A.L.R.3d 
1293. 
Key Numbers. — False Imprisonment <s=» 2, 
10, 13, 15. 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
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or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Alcohol use by minor. 
Avoiding roadblock. 
Basis of suspicion. 
Court's findings. 
Drug use. 
No reasonable suspicion. 
Out-of-state licenses. 
Prostitution. 
Revoked license. 
Standard. 
Suspected shoplifting. 
Vehicles. 
Cited. 
Alcohol use by minor. 
Defendant's young appearance and the smell 
of alcohol on defendant's breath gave police 
officer a reasonable articulable suspicion, based 
on objective evidence, that the defendant had 
consumed alcohol and was a minor. State v. 
Bean, 869 P.2d 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Avoiding roadblock. 
Avoiding a roadblock, even assuming its le-
gality, without more, does not create an 
articulable suspicion that the occupants have 
engaged in or are about to engage in criminal 
activity. The act merely demonstrates a desire 
to avoid police confrontation, and at best only 
gives rise to a hunch that criminal activity may 
be afoot. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Basis of suspicion. 
The reasonable, articulable suspicion con-
templated in this section must be based on 
objective facts suggesting that the individual 
may be involved in criminal activity. State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In order to conclude that there was reason-
able suspicion to justify stopping defendant, an 
officer must be able to articulate some unlawful 
or suspicious behavior connecting the detainee 
to the suspected criminal activity. State v. Pot-
ter, 863 P.2d 40 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
When a reliable source with reasonable sus-
picion based on articulable facts reports the 
commission of a crime and, based on the re-
layed facts, the dispatcher communicates the 
information to the police, and the responding 
officer's own observations corroborate the dis-
patch, reasonable suspicion exists for a stop. 
State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
Court's findings. 
Trial court erred in ruling that a city police 
officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify 
seizing defendant, who was seen emerging from 
a 24-hour grocery store at 3:30 a.m., where the 
court made only a conclusory finding that de-
fendant's answers to questions regarding the 
ownership of a vehicle in the store parking lot 
were "inconsistent, vague and suspicious.* 
State v. Munsen, 821 R2d 13 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Drug use. 
When an officer saw defendant smoking a 
cigarette, which from her training and experi-
ence she recognized as a marijuana ^oint," 
while the defendant was in a vacant parking lot 
in his vehicle with the windows rolled up on a 
warm day, even though the defendant's activity 
was conceivably consistent with innocent activ-
ity, it was strongly indicative of criminal activ-
ity and the officer had reasonable grounds to 
stop the vehicle and investigate further. Provo 
City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
No reasonable suspicion. 
Where suspects were detained on the basis of 
a description by a fellow officer who had seen 
them walking in the vicinity of a burglary, and 
where the suspects were not observed at the 
scene of the crime, or engaging in unlawful or 
suspicious activity, the "reasonable suspicion" 
test was not met. State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 
718 (Utah 1985). 
Detention of defendant on a city street at 
3:30 a.m. was unreasonable where the initial 
decision to stop was based merely on the late-
ness of the hour and the high-crime factor in 
the area, and defendant's "nervous" conduct 
was consistent with innocent as well as with 
criminal behavior. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Seizure of defendant's automobile was in-
valid, where his initial stop for driving in the 
left lane had been used as a pretext to support 
the arresting officer's "hunch" that defendant 
was engaged in illegal activity. State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
No reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
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The defendant's brief visit to a house under 
surveillance because of a suspicion of drug 
trafficking was not a sufficient basis for an 
officer to stop the defendant's vehicle after her 
departure from the house. The facts were not 
sufficient to give the officer an articulable sus-
picion that the defendant had engaged in crimi-
nal activity. State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
Out-of-state licenses. 
An officer had no reasonable suspicion to 
make an investigatory stop based merely on the 
fact that a car with out-of-state license plates 
was moving slowly through a neighborhood late 
at night. State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 
1986). 
Prostitution. 
Police officers who observed a woman stand-
ing on a sidewalk talking to the male occupant 
of a pickup truck, and who believed that a 
prostitution deal had been made, were autho-
rized to investigate more fully by interviewing 
the occupants of the vehicle. State v. Holmes, 
774 P.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Revoked license. 
Police officers had reasonable suspicion to 
make an investigatory stop of defendant's ve-
hicle, where they knew that defendants driv-
er's license had been revoked and that his 
passenger was sought on an arrest warrant. 
Utah Law Review. — The Police Dog: Pos-
sibilities for Abuse in Finding Probable Cause 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-16, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
ANALYSIS 
Interpretation of section. 
Reasonable belief test. 
Interpretation of section. 
This section must be interpreted to meet the 
constitutional requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987). 
Standard. 
In traffic violation stops, in balancing the 
rights of individuals to be free from arbitrary 
interference by law enforcement officers and 
the government's interest in crime prevention 
and public protection, if a hypothetical reason-
able police officer would not have stopped the 
driver for the cited traffic offense, and the 
surrounding circumstances indicate the stop is 
a pretext, the stop is unconstitutional. State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Suspected shoplifting. 
Defendant's pre-arrest seizure was valid, 
where he was seen by police officers near a 
shopping mall entrance removing a box from 
beneath his shirt, and his actions in transfer-
ring the box's contents into a bag strongly 
suggested shoplifting. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 
537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Vehicles. 
Evidence sufficient to conclude that the occu-
pants of a vehicle may have been engaged in 
criminal activity. State v. Baumgaertel, 762 
P.2d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Cited in Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 
1062 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Davis, 821 
P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Leonard, 
825 P.2d 664 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
for Arrest, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 408. 
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Arrest §§ 38 to 42. 
(1968). State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 
1986). 
Reasonable belief test. 
In assessing the reasonableness of the offic-
er's actions, it is not essential that the officer 
actually be in fear, nor need he be absolutely 
certain that the individual is armed. The issue 
is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for 
dangerous weapon — Grounds. 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may 
frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any 
other person is in danger. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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History: C. 1953, 77-7-6, enacted by L. sections (1), (2), and (3) as (l)(a), (1Kb), and 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1995, ch. 118, § 1. (l)(c), added new Subsection (2), and made a 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- minor punctuation change, 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, redesignated Sub-
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS State v. Case, 884 R2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 
Basis of suspicion. 
No reasonable suspicion. Standard. 
Standard. While the required level of reasonable suspi-
Vehicles c*on ls lower than the standard required for 
- Possible hidden compartment. probable cause to arrest, the same totality of 
facts and circumstances approach is used to 
Basis of suspicion. determine if there are sufficient "specific and 
This section contemplates that an officer may articulable facts" to support reasonable suspi-
complete a non-consensual investigative stop cion. State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. 
and stay within the boundaries drawn by the App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 
constitution if the officer is able to point to 1995). 
objective, specific, and articulable facts that Vehicles. 
warrant the intrusion upon the person. State v. 
Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), - Possible hidden compartment. 
cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). Objective facts upon which officers suspi-
cions were based, including an apparent sub-
No reasonable suspicion. stantial structural modification of defendant's 
In the absence of any evidence concerning the pickup truck in order to conceal a hidden corn-
factual basis for the radioed instruction on partment, supported a reasonable suspicion 
which the investigating officer acted, the state that defendant was involved in criminal activ-
failed to meet its burden of establishing facts ity. State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. 
supporting the reasonable, articulable suspi- App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 
cion necessary to stop defendant's vehicle. 1995). 
77-7-19. Appearance required by citation — Arrest for 
failure to appear — Transfer of cases — Motor 
vehicle violations — Disposition of fines and 
costs. 
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall appear before the mag-
istrate designated in the citation on or before the time and date specified in the 
citation unless the uniform bail schedule adopted by the Judicial Council or 
Subsection 77-7-21(1) permits forfeiture of bail for the offense charged. 
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear sooner than five days or 
later than 14 days following its issuance. 
(3) A person who receives a citation and who fails to comply with Section 
77-7-21 on or before the time and date and at the court specified is subject to 
arrest. The magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest. 
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a citation or information issued 
for violations of Title 41 shall state that the person receiving the citation or 
information shall appear before the magistrate who has jurisdiction over the 
offense charged. 
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of either the defense 
attorney or prosecuting attorney, based on a lack of territorial jurisdiction or 
the disqualification of the judge, transfer cases to a justice court with 
territorial jurisdiction or the district court within the county. 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
John Bradley NICHOIAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 96-4022. 
(D.C.N0.94-CR-3) 
United States Court of 
Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 
Dec. 20, 1996. 
Before PORFILIQ, HOLLOWAY, 
and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges, 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FNl] 
?N1. This order and 
judgment: is not binding 
precedent, except under 
the doctrines of law of 
the case, res judicata, 
and collateral estoppel. 
This court generally 
disfavors the citation of 
orders and judgments; 
nevertheless, an order 
and judgment may be cited 
under the terms and 
conditions of 10th Cir. 
R. 36.3. 
**1 Defendant appeals the 
district court's decision 
denying nis motion to suppress 
evidence seized during the 
course of a traffic stop. 
Following the court's ruling, 
defendant entered a 
conditional guilty plea to 
possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to 
distribute in violation of 21 
U.S-C. § 841(a)(1) and receipt 
of a firearm by a restricted 
person in violation of IS 
U.S.C. § 922 (n). On appeal, 
defendant argues the police 
officers' conduct violated the 
Fourth Amendment because it 
was not justified at its 
inception and was not 
reasonably related in scope to 
the surrounding circumstances. 
We believe the record fails to 
support the district courtTs 
finding the defendant's 
initial stop was reasonable 
and reverse. 
At 5:5C am en December 19, 
1993, Officer Lance London, 
patrollinc in the city of 
South Ogden, Utah, noticed a 
car parked in the lot of an 
all-night bowling alley. He 
observed a passenger exit from 
the car and wave his arms in 
the air. As Officer London 
pulled into the parking lot, 
the passenger put something on 
the ground, leaned in-co the 
car to speak to the driver, 
then shut the car door and 
walked into the bowling alley. 
Officer London circled the 
parked car and noted the 
object on the ground was a 
beer can, but did not see 
whether the can was open or 
closed. [FN2] London also 
noted that the driver, 
defendant John Bradley 
Nicholas, sat still and kept 
his head forward until the 
officer had driven past. As 
the officer parked and got out 
of his car, Mr. Nicholas drove 
out of the let, making a 
proper stop at the exit and a 
lawful right turn onto the 
street. Officer London 
followed and pulled Mr. 
Nicholas ever to the curb a 
short distance from the lot. 
Officer London described the 
stop in this testimony: 
FN2. An officer retrieved 
the can after Nicholas's 
arresr; the can was 
closed. 
Q. Okay. Officer London, what 
did you stop the vehicle for? 
A, I thought: it likely that 
the driver roay have been 
drinking. 
Q. And what factors did you 
observe that led you to 
believe that? 
A. Weil, i saw what I 
believed was someone getting 
out of the car with what I 
thought to be an open 
container. 
Q. Arid was there anything 
about the behavior of either 
of the persons that gave ycu 
any suspicion? 
A. Well, I noticed the 
passenger acting strangely but 
the driver just—I thought it 
suspicious the way rhe driver 
didn't look at me just— 
0- If he had looked at you 
would that make you 
suspicious? 
A. Well, not necessarily. It 
just—the driver se&r&a 
nervous about me being there. 
Q. Whan was in your mind? 
What was the reason you pulled 
the vehicle over? 
A. I thought the driver may 
have been drinking, (emphasis 
added). 
As Officer London approached, 
Mr. Nicholas opened the 
driver's side door and asked 
rhe officer why he had oeen 
stopped. The officer replied 
he had seen a passenger exit 
the car with a beer and 
wondered if Mr. Nicholas had 
been drinking. If there was a 
reply to the question, the 
officer later testified he 
could not recall it. [FN3] 
FN3. Utah law permits 
drivers to have closed 
containers of beer in 
their cars. It is legal 
to drink from open 
containers of alcohol in 
parking lots but not on 
roadways- Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44.20 provides: 
(1) a person nay not 
drink any alcoholic 
beverage while operating 
a motor vehicle or while 
a passenger in a motor 
vehicle, whether the 
venicle is moving, 
stopped, or parked on any 
highway; (2) a person 
may not keep, carry, 
possess, transport, or 
allow another tc keep/ 
carry, possess/ or 
transport in the 
passenger compartment of 
a motor vehicle, when the 
vehicle is on any 
highway, any container 
which contains any 
alcoholic beverage if the 
container has been 
opened, its seai broken, 
or the contents of the 
container partially 
consumed. 
Utah law does not 
specifically forbid a 
person from driving after 
having consumed alcoholic 
beverages. Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(2) 
provides: 
(a) A person may not 
operate or be in actual 
physical control of a 
vehicle within this state 
if the person: (i) has a 
blood or breath alcohol 
concentration cf .08 
grams or greater , .. or 
(ii) is under the 
influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or tne combined 
influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that 
renaers the person 
incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
Thereafter, events took place 
that are unnecessary to 
reiterate here save tc note 
searches of the vehicle 
occurred leading to the 
production of evidence 
supporting the charges filed 
against the defendant, we 
need not detail either the 
events or the products of the 
searches because the stop is 
key to what followed. Indeed/ 
because of the testimony of 
Officer London, the entire 
case revolves about the 
validity of the initial stop. 
**2 A traffic stop 
constitutes a seizure within 
the meaning of the Fcurth 
Amendment; for purposes of 
constitutional analysis, it is 
characterized as an 
investigative detention rather 
than a custodial arrest. 
United States v. Botero-
Qspinar 71 F.3d 753/ 786 »10th 
Cir.1995), cert, denied, 116 
S.Ct. 2529 (1996). An 
investigative detention must 
be based upon " 'specific and 
articulable facts which, taker, 
together with reasonable 
inferences from those facts, 
seasonably warrant that 
intrusion.' " United States 
v. Leef 73 F.3d 1034, 1038 
(10th Cir.1996) (quoting Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 
(1968)). Reasonable suspicion 
is determined by the totality 
o£ the circumstances, id.; 
United States v* Barbee, 966 
F,2d 1026, 1028 (ICth 
Cir,1992); but to justify the 
stop, the detaining officer 
must have a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the 
detainee has been, is, or is 
about to be engaged in 
criminal activity* Dnited 
States v. Nicholson, 983 F-2d 
983r 987 (10th Cir.1993). An 
officer's unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch cannot 
create circumstances giving 
rise to reasonable suspicion-
United States v. Fernandez, 18 
F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir.1994), 
We review findings of fact 
related to a motion to 
suppress in a light most 
favorable to the government 
and set aside those findings 
only when clearly erroneous• 
United States v. Davis, 94 
F.3d 1465, 1467 (ICth 
Cir.1996). "We review de novo, 
however, the district court's 
conclusion an officer has a 
reasonable, articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity 
at the time of the seizure. 
Id. This review is in two 
steps• First, we determine 
whether the officer's action 
was justified at its 
inception; then, whether the 
action was reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances 
which justified the 
interference in the first 
place. Lee, 73 F.3d at 1038; 
Bctero-Ospina, 71 F,3d at 786. 
A traffic stop is justified at 
its inception if "this 
particular officer has 
reasonable suspicion that this 
particular motorist violated 
'any one of the multitude of 
applicable traffic and 
equipment regulations' of the 
jurisdiction.w Botero-Ospina 
at 71 F.3d at 787 (citations 
omitted)• 
The district court's 
conclusion Officer London had 
reasonable suspicion was based 
upon five factors: (1) the 
incident occurred early in the 
morning; (2) the passenger 
made strange gestures when he 
exited the car; (3) the 
passenger placed a beer can on 
the ground; (4) the defendant 
did not make eye contact with 
Officer London, and; (5) the 
defendant drove out of the 
parking lot as the officer 
parked and started to get out 
of his car. While 
reasonableness of the 
officer's conduct is assessed 
using a totality of the 
circumstances test, 
examination of each factor is 
useful because "[s]ome facts 
must be outrightly dismissed 
as 30 innocent or susceptible 
to varying interpretations as 
to be innocuous," Lee, 73 
F.3d at 1039. 
The time of the incident has 
little relevance in this 
analysis, Mr, Nicholas's car 
was parked in the lot of an 
establishment that was open 
for twenty-four hours each 
day. It is reasonably 
inferable the business 
maintained those hours because 
enough customers frequented it 
late at night and early in the 
morning to make its hours of 
operation appropriate. Had 
defendant's car been spotted 
in the lot of an abandoned 
building, or at least a closed 
business/ the district court's 
consideration of the time of 
day to shroud the incident in 
suspicion would have been more 
logical. Second, the 
connection between the early 
hour and the likelihood of Mr. 
Nicholas's intoxication is 
counter-intuitive• The time 
of day might be important if 
Officer London suspected Mr. 
Nicholas of falling asleep at 
the wheel, or even of engaging 
in general malfeasance, but 
the government offers the 
early morning hour as evidence 
to support London's particular 
suspicion that Nicholas had 
been drinking. Because the 
government presented no 
testimony to explain the basis 
for this inference, we fail tc 
understand why it is more 
likely that Mr. Nicholas would 
have b^Bti drinking beer at 
5:30 am than at another time 
of day. 
**3 Of equal concern is the 
evidentiary value of the 
passenger's odd gestures and 
possession of a beer. Albeit 
those facts might have 
provided Officer London with 
reasonable suspicion that the 
passenger had been drinking, 
but he did not explain, nor 
can we see, how those acts or 
any of the passenger's other 
acts form a constitutionally-
sound basis for believing 
defendant had been drinking. 
Indeed, courts have long 
recognized that an 
individual's mere proximity to 
questionable or illegal 
conduct does not imply 
involvement in that conduct, 
and may not be used to justify 
police intrusion. See Sibron 
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-
63 (1968) (defendant's 
interaction with known drug 
addicts over period of eight 
hours did not create probable 
cause for officer's subsequent 
search and seizure!; Ybarra 
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 
(1979) ("a person's mere 
propinquity to others 
independently suspected of 
criminal activity does not, 
without more, give rise to 
probable cause . •. [w]here tne 
standard is probable cause, a 
search or seizure cf a person 
must be supported by probable 
cause particularized with 
respect to that person"); 
Brown v. Texas, 4 43 U.S. 47, 
52 (defendant's presence in 
neighborhood frequented by 
drug users and officer's 
contention that situation 
"looked suspicious" did not 
support finding of reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant; 
specific, objective facts must 
indicate that particular 
individual involved in illegal 
activity). 
The government interprets 
Nicholas's failure to make eye 
contact with the officer as 
nervous behavior, presumably 
suggesting a guilty 
conscience. This argument is 
supported neither by logic nor 
by case law. Involuntary 
contact with a police officer 
will often elicit some feeling 
of anxiety in a law- abiding 
citizen. Here, Officer London 
slowly circled Mr. Nicholasfs 
parked car and then stopped 
directly behind hin without 
indicating any purpose or 
reason for his interest. We 
believe it quite^appropriate 
that Mr, Nicholas would feel 
some wariness or {apprehension 
in that situation. 
Moreover,, we na-|e 
acknowledged tha$ nervousness 
seldom serves asja reliable 
factor in determining whether 
an officer's conduct was 
justified, in Fernandez, we 
reminded: j 
We have repeatedly held that 
nervousness is of limited 
significance in]determining 
reasonable suspicion and 
that the government's 
repetitive reliance on the 
nervousness of either the 
driver or passenger as a 
basis for reasonable 
suspicion in all cases of 
this kind must jpe treated 
with caution, :i 
Id. at 879 (citation 
omitted)• Furthermore, in 
Barbee, we specifically 
discounted avoidance of eye 
contact as suspicious 
behavior: n[S]uah behavior 
[passengers .sinking down below 
seat level] is suspicious 
conduct not cleanly 
susceptible to unsuspicious 
interpretations, junlike 
passengers merely avoiding eye 
contact....* Id] at 1029. 
Interestingly, dfficer 
London's testimony reveals the 
unreliability ofjthis factor* 
Although he stated that Mr. 
Nicholas's lack qf eye contact 
raised his suspicion, he 
almost immediately 
contradicted himself by 
conceding that hid Mr. 
Nicholas looked at him 
instead, Officer {London might 
have found that auspicious as 
well. [FN4] 
FK4. The Ninth Circuit 
has remarked that the 
phenomenon of allowing 
both eye contact and 
avoidance of eye contact 
to qualify as suspicious 
behavior wput[s] the 
officers in a classic 
'heads I win, tails you 
lose1 position." United 
States v. Garcia-Camacho, 
53 F.3d 244, 247 (9th 
Cir-1995). 
**4 The government argued, 
and the district court 
accepted, that Mr, Nicholas's 
departure from the parking lot 
after the officer pulled up 
behind him constituted 
suspicious behavior, 
suggesting that act was viewed 
as an attempt to evade the 
officer. Yet, defendant's 
actions were not consistent 
with that theory. Mr, 
Nicholas left the parking lot 
just after his passenger 
exited from the car and 
entered the bowling alley. 
Officer London did not turn en 
his emergency lights, call 
out, or indicate in any other 
way that he expected Mr. 
Nicholas to remain in the 
parking lot. Nicholas did not 
speed out of the lot, and he 
pulled to the side of the road 
as soon as London signaled him 
to stop, indeed, Officer 
London did not testify that 
defendant's departure from the 
parking lot was unwarranted in 
any way. 
This court already has 
refused to characterize as 
suspicious than that of Mr. 
Nicholas, The driver in 
Fernandez, for example, pulled 
into the emergency lane after 
noticing a police officer 
following him- After a 
quarter mile, the officer 
pulled into the :.ane behind 
him but did not activate his 
lights. The driver reentered 
traffic, and the officer 
switched lanes again and 
stopped the car. We rejected 
the government's argument that 
the driver's condact 
constituted evasion, 
emphasizing that the driver 
pulled over prorrptiy when 
signaled by the officer. 
Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 878-79. 
In reliance upon Terry, the 
government argues while each 
factor independently 
constitutes entirely innocent 
behavior, all the factors 
taken together transform the 
situation into veritable 
opprobrium. But this is not a 
case liice Terry, where the 
defendants' actions could only 
be understood when examined as 
a series of interconnected 
events-. Instead, Nicholas's 
conduct was appropriate at 
each separate step as well as 
within the content of the 
overall situation. While 
acknowledging a totality of 
the circumstances test governs 
this analysis, we cannot 
discount completely the fact 
that none of the individual 
factors supports a specific, 
particularized suspicion Mr. 
Nicholas was committing a 
ciime. 
Several additional 
factors relied upon by the 
government and the district 
court. First, Officer London 
had no prior contact with Mr. 
Nicholas and had no basis to 
evaluate his demeanor or the 
likelihood that he would be 
drinking at a rather unusual 
time of day. See United 
States v. Bloom, 975 F,2d 
1447, 145$ {10th Cir.1992) 
("we do not understand how 
Agent Ochoa would know whether 
defendant was acting nervous 
and excited or whether he was 
merely acting in his normal 
manner"), overruled on other 
grounds United States v. 
Little, 18 F.3d 1499 (10th 
Cir.1994). 
Second, Officer London had 
not received a tip or 
information from another law 
enforcement officer that Mr. 
Nicholas might be engaging in 
illegal activity. See Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 
(1972) (reasonable suspicion 
to stop and frisk defendant 
supported by receipt of tip); 
Nicholson, 983 F.26 at 987 
(reasonable suspicion 
supported by information and 
description received from 
other police officers). 
**5 Third, Officer London 
testified he stopped Mr. 
Nicholas because he believed 
he might have been drinking. 
Consumption of alcohol by 
persons over the age of 
twentyone is not a crime; 
therefore, Officer London, 
must have meant he stopped Mr* 
Nicholas because he suspected 
He was driving under the 
influence of alcohol. 
However, Officer London was 
unable to recall Mr, 
Nicholas's response to his 
specific question., whether ne 
had in fact been drinking, and 
did not provide any evidence 
other than hia hunch that such 
was the case. He did net, for 
example, attempt to 
substantiate that hunch by 
performance of field sobriety 
tests. See Fernandez/ 18 F.2C 
at 881 (finding detention 
exceeded proper scope and 
noting officer "administered 
no roadside sobriety tests; 
did not request the defendant 
submit to biood, breath, or 
urine tests; and issued no 
citation for driving while 
impaired"). 
Furthermore, Officer London 
described no driving pattern 
chat might support an 
inference thai: Mr. Nicholas 
was criving under the 
influence of alconol. Yet, we 
have consistently relied uoon 
evidence of improper operation 
of a vehicle to uphold the 
validity of a traffic stop. 
See Lee, 73 F.3d at 1038 
(straddling lane and lane 
change supported reasonable 
suspicion that driver was 
sleepy or intoxicated; 
initial stop valid); Betere-
Ospina, 71 F.3d at 738 
(traveling under speed limit 
and straddling lane supported 
reasonable suspicion driver 
impaired); King, 990 F.2d at 
1561 (incessant honking at 
scene of accident provided 
justification tc detain driver 
tc inform and advise cf 
conditions; initial stop 
valid). But see Barbee, 966 
F.2d at 1029 {listing six 
factors, but none a moving 
violation, to support federal 
agent's reasonable suspicion 
illegal immigrants were riding 
in vehicle). 
The evidence in this case 
simply does not support a 
determination that at the time 
of the initial stop Officer 
London had reasonable, 
particularized suspicion Mr. 
Nicholas had coan&itted or was 
committing a crime. The 
traffic stop, therefore, 
violated defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. Davis, 94 
F.3d at 14 68-^0, Although the 
events occurring after the 
stop demonstrated Mr. Nicholas 
was in apparent violation cf 
the law, we must constantly 
remind ourselves a seizure is 
not made valid by what a 
subsequent search produces. 
The judgment of the district 
court is REVERSED, and the 
cause is REMANDED with 
instructions to vacate the 
conditional plea* 
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